Adam Ingram: As part of the routine management of UK forces in the multinational division (south-east) (MND(SE)) in Iraq, we intend to conduct a roulement of forces involving the replacement of 40 Commando Royal Marines with the 2nd Battalion the Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment.
	The Secretary of State for Defence announced on 17June 2004, (Official Report, column 48), that 40 Commando would deploy to MND(SE) during June and July, both to provide support to Iraqi security forces and to provide the capacity for some other tasks, including the protection of essential infrastructure. The General Officer comanding MND(SE) has concluded that there will be a continuing requirement for these tasks beyond elections in Iraq planned for 30 January. Based on this advice, we have decided that 2nd Battalion the Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment should replace 40 Commando when their six month deployment in Iraq comes to an end in January 2005.
	Since 1 November, 2nd Battalion the Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment has been acting as the very high readiness reserve (VHRR), at 10 days' readiness to deploy to Iraq. In January the responsibility for VHRR will pass from 2 Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment to the 1st Battalion the Royal Scots.
	The roulement is currently planned to take place from early January 2005, with handover to 2nd Battalion the Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment complete by mid- January. We expect that the number of armed forces personnel in theatre will remain broadly the same as a result of these changes, with the other major UK units currently in Iraq unchanged. These units are as follows:
	4 Armoured Brigade Headquarters and Signal Squadron
	The Queen's Dragoon Guards
	The Royal Dragoon Guards
	4th Regiment Royal Artillery
	1st Battalion Scots Guards
	1st Battalion Welsh Guards
	1st Battalion The Duke of Wellington's Regiment
	21 Engineer Regiment
	I would emphasise that these are routine adjustments to UK forces in MND(SE). We continue to consider, with our partners in the multinational force, the levels and dispositions of forces required in Iraq in the months ahead, to support the sovereign Interim Government of Iraq through the process leading to the election of an Iraqi Transitional Government and assembly in January 2005 and full constitutional elections in December 2005. If we judge that further changes to the UK military contribution in Iraq would be appropriate to support this process, we will of course inform the House at the earliest opportunity. At present, however, no such decision has been made.

Nick Raynsford: This statement provides the final details relating to the business rates revaluation that will take effect from 1 April 2005. It confirms the results of the consultations on proposals announced in my written statement of 21 July, (Official Report, columns 30–33WS), gives details of the transitional relief scheme and sets out the final small business rate relief scheme. In addition it includes the provisional non-domestic rating multipliers for 2005–06 and adjustments to the thresholds for various reliefs.
	The Local Government Act 2003 requires the 2005 revaluation to be accompanied by a transition scheme to lessen the effects of sudden and significant rises in rates bills. The legislation provides that the scheme must be self-financing, so that the costs do not fall on other taxpayers. In July we announced the proposal for a four-year self-financing transitional scheme with the costs of phasing in increases met by phasing down the reductions in liability for others. The scheme seeks to provide an appropriate balance between protecting those who have larger increases in rates bills and allowing those who enjoy a fall in bills to receive the full benefit as quickly as possible.
	We consulted on this proposal over the summer and   most respondents felt that the proposed scheme struck the right balance. The Valuation Office Agency published the draft rating lists on 1 October and the updated valuations in the draft list have resulted in the transition scheme costing less than we initially estimated. We therefore have been able to reduce the impact of the scheme on those ratepayers that are paying for it.
	As a result the caps for properties experiencing increases will be 12.5 per cent., 17.5 per cent., 20 per cent. and 25 per cent. for the four years, and for small properties 5 per cent., 7.5 per cent., 10 per cent. and 15 per cent. Large properties experiencing reductions in rate bills will be capped at the rates of 12.5 per cent., 12.5 per cent., 14 per cent. and 25 per cent. For small properties, the rates are 30 per cent., 30 per cent., 35 per cent. and 60 per cent. These downward caps are significantly more generous than the consultation levels or than any previous transitional scheme. They mean that those expecting decreases in their rates bills will benefit more quickly than under earlier schemes. Also, the effect of the separate capping levels means that small businesses will only be required to make a very small contribution to the scheme.
	Government recognises that the current system of business rates places a disproportionate burden on small businesses. The scheme we consulted on over the summer proposed that rate relief should be available at 50 per cent. for single properties with a rateable value up to £5,000, with relief declining in percentage terms on a sliding scale with no relief at a rateable value of £10,000. In addition we proposed a buffer zone so that eligible business properties with rateable values between £10,000 and £15,000 would not have to contribute towards the relief. The scheme is designed to be funded through a supplement on the rates bills of larger businesses.
	The feedback from the consultation suggested that the eligibility criteria should be extended, that the buffer zones for London should be amended and various technical changes made to the draft regulations. We will now introduce a scheme where the ratepayer will be eligible for the relief if all their main properties fall within the appropriate threshold, and the other properties are under a rateable value of £2,200. The relief will apply to the main property only. This extends the relief to more ratepayers while not increasing the financial burden on large ratepayers or introducing complex administrative arrangements. In addition we will raise the threshold for the buffer zone in London to £21,500.
	In line with the Local Government Act 2003, from 1 April 2005, there will be two multipliers, the small business non-domestic rating multiplier, which is applicable to those that qualify for the small business relief or in the buffer zone, and the non-domestic rating multiplier which includes the supplement to pay for small business relief. The small business non-domestic rating multiplier for 2005–06 is 41.5p per pound of rateable value, and the non-domestic rating multiplier is 42.2p. This means that those paying for the relief will see a 1.6 per cent. increase in rates bills as a result.
	In addition we will adjust the thresholds for a variety of rate reliefs in line with the general increase in rateable values. The relief for rural single petrol stations and pubs will increase from £9,000 to £10,500, for other rural single enterprises from £6,000 to £7,000 with discretionary relief from £12,000 to £14,000. Relief for stud farms will increase from £3,000 to £3,500, former agricultural premises from £6,000 to £7,000 and small unoccupied property from £1,900 to £2,200.

Over Thirty Months Rule

Jack Straw: My answer to the question from the right hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. Michael Ancram) of 17 November, (Official Report, column 1548W), set out what HM Government knew of reports of a planned coup in Equatorial Guinea earlier this year. This statement informs the House more widely of the position. At all times we acted properly, promptly, and entirely in accordance with international law.
	The United Kingdom has normal diplomatic relations with the Government of Equatorial Guinea, which is a former Spanish colony. We have no embassy in the country. Our high commissioner in neighbouring Cameroon is accredited as ambassador to Equatorial Guinea and has responsibility for relations with Equatorial Guinea. There is a British community of some hundreds, many involved in the energy sector. We have an honorary consul and a commercial attaché in the capital, Malabo.
	The country has in the past suffered political instability. Rumours of upheaval and further instability are common. For example there were reports picked up by BBC monitoring in October 2003 of an imminent planned coup. These appeared not to be accurate; certainly, there was no coup.
	On 29 January this year the Foreign Office received an intelligence report of preparations for a possible coup in Equatorial Guinea. The report was the first intelligence we had received. It was not definitive enough for us to   conclude that a coup was likely or inevitable. It was   passed by another Government to us on the normal   condition that it not be passed on. There were, coincidentally, reports on Spanish radio, and in both El Pais and El Mundo on 30 January, making similar suggestions that a coup was being planned in Equatorial Guinea, and reporting that Spanish naval vessels were sailing towards the country.
	British newspapers have this week reported that a South African national, Johann Smith, is claiming to have passed to contacts in British intelligence in December 2003 and in January 2004 a note setting out in detail plans for a coup. We have no record of this information being passed to British officials at any time before May 2004.
	I received a submission, dated 30 January, from FCO officials on the weekend of 30 January-1 February which summarised both the media and intelligence reports and made recommendations to me. I considered the case and agreed that the FCO should approach an individual formerly connected with a British private military company, mentioned in the report of 29 January, both to attempt to test the veracity of the report, and to make clear that the FCO was firmly opposed to any unconstitutional action such as coups d'etat. A senior Foreign Office official did so within days. The individual concerned claimed no knowledge of the plans.
	On 3 February we changed our travel advice to reflect our latest assessment. This reads "visitors should expect . . . isolated incidents of political unrest" in Equatorial Guinea, particularly as "legislative elections are scheduled for the first quarter of 2004".
	In anticipation of these elections our ambassador in Yaounde was due to visit Malabo in early February. We instructed him to continue with his planned visit. He found the situation calm. But as a precaution, our consular crisis plan for Equatorial Guinea was reviewed. Given our limited British representation, it had not been recently updated.
	We did not pass the report of 29 January to the Equatorial Guinea Government. It had been passed to us on the condition that it not be passed on to any thirdparty. But there were two considerations of substance which led us to this judgement in any event. First, because there had been media reports about preparations for a possible coup which the Equatorial Guinea government would already have seen. Second, because it was not definitive enough for us to conclude that a coup was likely or inevitable. Indeed, we went back to the originating government and to another Government which had also received the report to check their belief in the veracity of the report. Their responses gave no certainty. The fact that the rumours were in the public domain suggested in any event that a successful coup was growing less likely.
	There have been some suggestions in the press that the British Government were under a legal obligation to act differently. We do not condone or support unconstitutional action including coup d'etat of any kind in other countries. But my understanding is that governments are under no legal obligation to pass on information which they may receive about such possible action.
	On 9 March we learned that the Zimbabwean authorities had arrested a number of individuals in Harare, alleged to be on their way to effect a coup in Equatorial Guinea. A number of individuals were also arrested in Malabo in connection with the alleged coup plot. Over the following months, the names of a number of others allegedly involved appeared in the media.
	On 28 August the Foreign Office press office was asked by The Observer if the Government knew before March that a coup was going to happen. It replied, correctly, that the FCO did not. As I told the right hon.   Member for Devizes (Mr. Michael Ancram) on 9 November I had first heard reports of possible coup planning in late January this year. And this I followed up with a fuller account for the House in my answer to the right hon. Member's questions on 17 November.